File Name: kripke wittgenstein on rules and private language .zip
A central part of Kripke's influential interpretation of Wittgenstein's sceptical argument about meaning is the rejection of dispositional analyses of what it is for a word to mean what it does Kripke, In this paper I show that Kripke's arguments prove too much: if they were right, they would preclude not only the idea that dispositional properties can make statements about the meanings of words true, but also the idea that dispositional properties can make true statements about paradigmatic dispositional properties such as a cup's fragility or a person's bravery. However, since dispositional properties can make such statements true, Kripke-Wittgenstein's arguments against dispositionalism about meaning are mistaken. This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution. Rent this article via DeepDyve.
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is a book by philosopher of language Saul Kripke in which he contends that the central argument of Ludwig Wittgenstein 's Philosophical Investigations centers on a devastating rule-following paradox that undermines the possibility of our ever following rules in our use of language. Kripke writes that this paradox is "the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date" p. He argues that Wittgenstein does not reject the argument that leads to the rule-following paradox, but accepts it and offers a "skeptical solution" to alleviate the paradox's destructive effects. While most commentators accept that the Philosophical Investigations contains the rule-following paradox as Kripke presents it, few have concurred in attributing Kripke's skeptical solution to Wittgenstein. Kripke expresses doubts in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language as to whether Wittgenstein would endorse his interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations. He says that his book should not be read as an attempt to give an accurate summary of Wittgenstein's views, but rather as an account of Wittgenstein's argument "as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him" p.
This togetherness of being and thinking has nothing in common with the Parmenidean one Heidegger tried to explicate phenomenologically. Caputo points beyond Heidegger to "a thinking which has been released from th conditions of finitude " and for which " there is only presence and only manifestedness " p. But to the ear of those as yet unbeatified such language can only be understood as that of the metaphysics of presence, which occludes the true phenomenality of being as a wresting from concealment. It is unclear how these religious representations can help us in the thinking of being, which is a rather sober, this-worldly task, since by "being" Heidegger never means anything transcending world. For its account of Heidegger and scholasticism and for its critique of previous studies on the topic this book is of great value. The positive suggestions of its last chapter remain, however, unconvincing, and leave unmet the daunting challenge of a deconstructive Heideggerian reading of Aquinas. Every student of philosophy or theology concerned with the task of "overcoming metaphysics " will nonetheless be gratefnl to Caputo for his original and thought-provoking contribution to the debate.
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So another person cannot understand the language. What Wittgenstein had in mind is a language conceived as necessarily comprehensible only to its single originator because the things which define its vocabulary are necessarily inaccessible to others.